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                     Abstract 
 
This article considers two recent lines of research concerned with the construction of 
imagined or simulated events that can provide insight into the relationship between memory and 
decision making. One line of research concerns episodic future thinking, which involves 
simulating episodes that might occur in one’s personal future, and the other concerns episodic 
counterfactual thinking, which involves simulating episodes that could have happened in one’s 
personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies that have examined the neural 
underpinnings of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking.  We argue that 
these studies have revealed that the two forms of episodic simulation engage a common core 
network including medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also supports episodic 
memory. We also note that neuroimaging studies have documented neural differences between 
episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking, including differences in 
hippocampal responses. We next consider behavioral studies that have delineated both 
similarities and differences between the two kinds of episodic simulation. The evidence indicates 
that episodic future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by similarly reduced levels of 
specific detail compared with episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly imagining a 
possible experience have sharply contrasting effects on the perceived plausibility of those events 
during episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual thinking. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing the functional consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for decisions.Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  3 
                
It is widely acknowledged that memory and decisions are closely related, but it is only 
relatively recently that the neural processes linking memory and decision-making have been the 
targets of systematic study. One emerging line of research that can potentially illuminate the 
relationship between memory and decisions centers on the role of a particular kind of memory – 
episodic memory, or the recollection of specific happenings in one’s personal past (Tulving, 
1983, 2002) - in the construction of imagined or simulated events. This line of work has focused 
on the process of episodic simulation (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008), where one draws on 
elements of past experiences in order to envisage hypothetical scenarios that might occur in 
one’s personal future or might have occurred in one’s personal past. In line with this general 
characterization, we can distinguish between two major kinds of episodic simulation: episodic 
future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. Episodic future thinking involves the 
construction of possible future personal episodes or scenarios (Atance & O’Neil, 2001; Szpunar, 
2010), whereas episodic counterfactual thinking involves simulating alternative versions or 
outcomes of past personal episodes that could have happened but did not occur (De Brigard & 
Giovanello, 2012; see Table 1 for definitions of these and other key terms). During the past few 
years, there has been an explosion of research concerning episodic future thinking, motivated to 
a large extent by the observation that a common core brain network is involved in both episodic 
memory and episodic future thinking (for a recent review, see Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, 
Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012). Though there has been less research concerning episodic 
counterfactual thinking, several recent papers have explored aspects of the phenomenon and its 
relationship to episodic memory (e.g., De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  4 
Schacter, & Giovenello, 2013; De Brigard, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2013; Gerlach, Dornblaser, & 
Schacter, 2013; Van Hoeck, Ma, Ampe, Baetens, Vandekerchove, & Van Overwalle, 2013). 
        Insert Table 1 about here 
It is important to note that episodic future and episodic counterfactual thinking appear to 
be distinct from general future and counterfactual thinking, whereby the contents of the mental 
simulations involve only impersonal and non-autobiographical events.  Hypothetical reasoning—
of which future and counterfactual thinking are subclasses—has been an active area of research 
in social psychology and behavioral economics for the last few decades. However, much of that 
research, if not all, has been conducted using vignettes depicting hypothetical scenarios with 
little to no autobiographical relevance to the experimental subject (e.g., Roese and Olson, 1995), 
Although it is typically assumed that the results obtained in these studies also apply to personally 
relevant future and counterfactual simulations, recent studies raise questions about the extent to 
which the results from studies using impersonal and non-autobiographical vignettes are 
applicable to the process of future and counterfactual simulations about one’s own personal life. 
In the case of counterfactual thinking, for instance, recent studies have shown that some effects 
that were found when participants had to think about alternative outcomes to impersonal and 
non-autobiographical events described in vignettes do not hold when participants have to think 
about alternative ways in which their own past personal events could have occurred (Girotto, 
Ferrante, Pighin, & Gonzalez, 2007; Pighin, Byrne, Ferrante, Gonzalez, & Girotto, 2011).  
The extent to which episodic future and episodic counterfactual thinking share cognitive 
processes is still an open question. Nonetheless, we believe there is now enough evidence to 
hypothesize that episodic versions of these kinds of hypothetical simulations constitute a 
psychological phenomenon distinguishable from their more generic counterparts, and that both Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  5 
depend extensively on episodic memory. The main purpose of the present article is to discuss the 
relationship between episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. Specifically, 
we will focus on two broad domains in which there has been experimental research on both 
forms of episodic simulation. First, we will consider neuroimaging studies of episodic future 
thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking with a view toward assessing the extent to which 
they engage the same or different brain regions and networks, and what role particular brain 
regions might play in each type of simulation. Second, we will consider behavioral studies that 
have delineated cognitive properties of each kind of episodic simulation, discussing specifically 
phenomenological properties of simulations, the effect of simulations on memory accuracy, and 
the effects of repetition on the subjective plausibility of simulations. We will conclude by 
considering the functional consequences of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual 
thinking for decision making and related processes. We also note two points about what the 
present article does not cover.  First, in line with the foregoing comments concerning the 
distinction between episodic future and episodic counterfactual thinking on the one hand and 
their more general counterparts on the other, we do not attempt in this brief article to cover the 
vast literature on hypothetical reasoning and non-episodic forms of counterfactual and future 
thinking. Second, we do not provide a general review of findings and perspectives concerning 
the now-substantial literature on episodic future thinking because several other recent reviews 
have done so (cf., Addis & Schacter, 2012; Klein, 2013; Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010). 
Neuroimaging studies of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking    
The first neuroimaging study of episodic future thinking was reported by Okuda et al. 
(2003). Participants were scanned (using PET) while talking about either the near past or future 
(i.e., the last or next few days) or the distant past or future (i.e., the last or next few years). Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  6 
Okuda et al. (2003) reported similar activity during past and future conditions in several 
prefrontal regions, as well as in the medial temporal lobe, including right hippocampus and 
bilateral parahippocampal gyrus.  While the past/future overlap observed in this study was 
striking, given the rather open-ended instructions to talk about the past or future, it was not clear 
whether or to what extent participants were engaged specifcally in episodic remembering or 
episodic future thinking – i.e., recollecting or simulating specific events – as opposed to 
retrieving general or semantic information about the past or future. 
However, subsequent neuroimaging studies using more constrained and controlled 
behavioral paradigms focusing on specific personal events have shown similar kinds of neural 
overlap between episodic memory and episodic future thinking. For example, Addis, Wong, and 
Schacter (2007) provided participants with word cues and instructed them to remember or 
imagine specific personal events from particular time periods in the past or future. The past and 
future tasks were divided into an initial construction phase during which participants generated a 
past or future event in response to the word cue and pressed a button when they had an event in 
mind, and an elaboration phase during which participants generated as much detail as possible 
about the event. Relative to non-episodic control conditions, Addis et al. (2007) reported 
extensive neural overlap during the past and future tasks in both the construction and elaboration 
phases: remembering the past and imagining the future were associated with activity in a 
network of regions including medial temporal (hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus) cortex, 
medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, as well as lateral temporal 
and prefrontal regions. Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott (2007) reported a similar neural 
activation pattern using a task in which participants were instructed to remember specific past  
personal events, imagine specific future personal events, or imagine specific events involving a Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  7 
familiar individual (Bill Clinton). Again, there was striking overlap in activity associated with 
past and future events in most of the same regions observed in the studies by Addis et al. (2007) 
and Okuda et al. (2003). Importantly, these regions were not activated to the same magnitude 
when imagining events involving Bill Clinton, providing evidence that activity in the engaged 
regions is related to the construction of specific events in one’s personal past or future.  
These observations have been replicated and extended in more recent studies (e.g, 
Abraham, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2008; Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Addis, 
Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; 
Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008). The collection of regions that show similarly increased 
activity during episodic memory and episodic future thinking – most prominently, medial 
temporal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortex, and lateral 
temporal and prefrontal regions – have been referred to as a “core network” (Schacter, Addis, & 
Buckner, 2007). This core network, in turn, overlaps substantially with the extensively studied 
default network (e.g., Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard, & Shulman, 2001), which 
has been linked with internally focused thought and attention (for reviews, see Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012).  
Within the core network, it is also possible to distinguish subsystems that are 
preferentially associated with remembering and imagining, respectively (Addis et al., 2009). 
Indeed, several neuroimaging studies have revealed neural differences between remembering the 
past and imagining the future, with most such studies showing greater activity in regions such as 
the hippocampus and frontopolar cortex during imagining compared with remembering (for 
review, see Schacter et al., 2012). Considerable attention has been paid in particular to 
understanding the basis for increased hippocampal activity during future imagining, with recent Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  8 
evidence indicating a possible role of encoding future simulations into memory (Martin, 
Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2011) as well as a role for the hippocampus in the initial 
construction of an imagined events, even when encoding processes are controlled (Gaesser, 
Spreng, McLelland, Addis, & Schacter, 2013; for general discussion, see Addis & Schacter, 
2012; Buckner, 2010; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Schacter & Addis, 2009). Recent evidence has 
also addressed the role of specific core network regions in supporting specific aspects of future 
event simulations. For example, Szpunar, St. Jacques, Robbins, Wig, and Schacter (2013) used a 
repetition suppression procedure in which participants repeatedly simulated future events 
involving specific people, objects, or locations, which were either changed or held constant 
across repetitions. Repetition-related reductions in neural activity are thought to reveal which 
brain regions are sensitive to processing specific kinds of stimuli or features (e.g., Grill-Spector, 
Henson, & Martin, 2006; Schacter, Wig, & Stevens, 2007). Based on such logic, Szpunar et al. 
demonstrated that distinct regions are sensitive to simulating the people (dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex), objects (inferior frontal and premotor cortices), and locations (retrosplenial, 
parahippocampal, and posterior parietal cortices) that typically constitute episodic simulations of 
future experiences (for related results, see also Hassabis, Spreng, Rusu, Robbins, Mar, & 
Schacter, 2013). 
Given the consistent observation of core network activity during episodic future thinking, 
an important question is whether this same network is implicated in episodic counterfactual 
thinking. Some evidence consistent with this possibility was reported by Addis et al. (2009), who 
examined neural activity associated both with imagining possible future events and imagining 
events that might have occurred in the past (but never did). Addis et al. (2009) found that the 
same subsystem of the core network associated with imagining future events (including regions Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  9 
within medial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, medial temporal lobe and medial parietal 
cortex) was engaged when participants imagined possible past events. 
While the results of Addis et al. (2009) suggest that episodic counterfactual thinking may 
recruit much the same network as episodic future thinking, the imaginary past events in their 
study not only had never occurred but were also unlikely, thus differing from episodic 
counterfactual thoughts, where the outcome of an actual past event is mentally mutated to create 
a likely alternative version. More recent neuroimaging studies have focused specifically on 
episodic counterfactual thinking. Van Hoeck et al. (2013) asked participants to remember 
positive or negative past experiences, imagine possible positive or negative future experiences, 
or generate “upward” counterfactual simulations in which they imagined how a past negative 
event might have turned out better (e.g., “If I had left the office earlier, I wouldn’t have missed 
my train.”). FMRI results revealed that episodic counterfactual thinking, just like episodic 
remembering and future thinking, recruited core network regions that had been observed in 
previous studies of remembering the past and imagining the future.  
A related fMRI study by De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, and Giovanello (2013) also 
documented an association between episodic counterfactual and key regions within the core 
network, and further provided information concerning how brain activity is modulated by the 
likelihood of a counterfactual outcome. In this study, prior to scanning participants recalled 
specific episodes characterized by either a positive or a negative outcome. During scanning, 
participants recalled some of these episodes, and also engaged in three different types of 
counterfactual simulations regarding other episodes. In the positive condition, they imagined 
what would have happened if a reported event whose outcome was negative instead had a 
positive outcome (i.e., upward counterfactual); in the negative condition, they imagined what Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  10 
would have happened if a reported event whose outcome was positive instead had a negative 
outcome (i.e., downward counterfactual); and in the peripheral condition, they imagined an 
alternative way in which the experienced outcome could have been brought about by changing a 
peripheral detail of the event. Participants also provided ratings of the subjective likelihood of 
the counterfactual events, thus allowing comparison of brain activity associated with 
counterfactual events that participants rated as likely versus those that they rated unlikely. Brain 
activity in these conditions was compared with activity from a control task, where participants 
constructed sentences that compared the sizes of different objects (cf., Addis et al., 2009). 
Consistent with the observations of Van Hoeck et al. (2013), results of a multivariate 
analysis (partial least squares) revealed a latent variable that distinguished patterns of brain 
activity during the remember, positive counterfactual, and negative counterfactual conditions 
relative to the non-episodic control condition. The pattern of brain activity common to the three 
experimental conditions was comprised entirely of core network regions identified in earlier 
work on remembering the past and imagining the future. No latent variable was uncovered that 
distinguished between positive and negative counterfactuals. However, a second latent variable 
did emerge that distinguished remembering and likely counterfactuals from unlikely 
counterfactuals. Moreover, the data suggest that likely counterfactuals preferentially recruited 
core network regions more strongly associated with remembered episodes, whereas unlikely 
counterfactuals preferentially engaged regions more strongly associated with imagined episodes 
(cf., Addis et al., 2009). This pattern of results shows that episodic counterfactuals deemed as 
likely recruited regions of the core brain network that were significantly more similar to those 
recruited during episodic recollection than to the brain regions recruited during episodic 
counterfactual thoughts that were deemed unlikely. Thus, in the context of this experimental Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  11 
design, the activation pattern of likely counterfactuals was somewhat more like episodic memory 
than unlikely counterfactuals.  
Overall, despite the fact that only a few relevant studies have been reported, it seems safe 
to conclude that episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking both engage 
regions that are also recruited when people remember specific past experiences from their 
everyday lives. On a general level, the overlap of this core-network with the default network is 
consistent with theoretical perspectives that have emphasized the role of this network in 
supporting various kinds of mental simulations (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter & 
Addis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007). On a more specific level, the joint recruitment of the core 
network is consistent with the proposal that it supports processes that can be generally employed 
to construct episodes, irrespective of whether they have happened or not (Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). 
However, though both episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking 
require similar constructive processes, these operate on material that is differentially constrained 
by reality. The future is inherently uncertain, and thus there are many degrees of freedom in 
simulating prospective episodes. By comparison, counterfactual thoughts are more constrained 
by the context of the past episodes, and any mental mutation of the past may clash with our 
knowledge of the event’s wider context. The two forms of episodic simulations may thus require 
different cognitive processes to cope with the specific nature of the imagined events, and may 
thus also partly differ in the associated pattern of neural activation. For example, Van Hoeck et 
al. (2013) reported that relative to episodic memory and future thinking, episodic counterfactual 
thinking preferentially engaged posterior aspects of medial frontal cortex, which the authors 
suggested reflected processes associated with conflict detection.  Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  12 
Another potentially intriguing difference between the two forms of simulations has been 
observed in the hippocampus. Studying episodic counterfactual simulations, De Brigard, Addis, 
et al. (2013) found that activity in anterior regions of the right hippocampus increased as a 
function of how likely participants perceived the simulated counterfactual event. In other words, 
the hippocampus was more strongly engaged during likely relative to unlikely episodic 
counterfactuals (although this effect was only observed for downward counterfactuals). In 
contrast, in a study on episodic future thinking, Weiler, Suchan, and Daum (2010) reported a 
decrease—rather than an increase—in anterior hippocampal activity for episodic future thoughts 
that were perceived as more likely to occur. Although a replication of this dissociation would be 
desirable, the pattern suggests that regions commonly recruited for episodic future and 
counterfactual thoughts may nonetheless be sensitive to differences in the nature of the specific 
episode being simulated (for further discussion, see De Brigard, Addis et al., 2013). However, 
much more work is required before it will be possible to offer confident theoretical 
interpretations of these differences. 
Behavioral studies of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking    
Numerous recent behavioral studies have compared the cognitive properties of 
remembered past events and imagined future events (for reviews, see Klein, 2013; Schacter et 
al., 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). These studies have revealed many 
similarities between the two, including such findings as parallel responses to experimental 
manipulations that increase the availability or vividness of episodic details (e.g., D’Argembeau 
& Van Der Linden, 2004; Madore, Gaesser, & Schacter, in press; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) 
and reductions in the episodic specificity of remembered and imagined events in a variety of 
populations, including older adults (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Gaesser, Sacchetti, Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  13 
Addis, & Schacter, 2011), schizophrenics (e.g., D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 
2008), depressed individuals (e.g., Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose, & MacLeod,1996), 
patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., Brown, Addis et al. 2013; Brown, Root, 
Romano, Chang, Bryant, & Hirst, 2013), and amnesic patients (e.g., Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, 
& Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Race, Keane, and Verfaellie, 2011; but see 
also Squire, van der Horst, McDuff, Franscino, Hopkins, & Mauldin, 2010). Analogous studies 
have not yet been reported with episodic counterfactual thinking, so it is still not possible to 
determine whether the correlated changes in episodic memory and episodic future thinking 
observed in the above populations extend to episodic counterfactual thinking. 
Despite many similarities in the cognitive properties of episodic remembering and future 
thinking, differences have also been documented, and here relevant evidence does exist 
concerning episodic counterfactual thinking.  Specifically, several studies have shown that 
remembered past events are subjectively experienced as more vivid and rich in sensory detail 
than are imagined future events (e.g., D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004) or imagined events 
in general (e.g., Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Similarly, studies that have used 
objective methods for characterizing the amount of episodic detail that participants provide when 
remembering or imagining have documented greater levels of episodic detail in remembered past 
events than imagined future events (e.g., Addis et al., 2008). De Brigard and Giovanello (2012) 
recently compared both subjective properties and objective features of remembered events with 
episodic counterfactual simulations as well as episodic future simulations, and reported evidence 
that remembered events were experienced as clear and more detailed, and objectively contained 
more episodic details than did either counterfactual or future simulations. However, although in 
most respects the phenomenological characteristics of episodic future thinking and episodic Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  14 
counterfactual thinking did not differ from one another, De Brigard and Giovanello (2012) found 
that participants reported experiencing a lower emotional intensity during episodic counterfactual 
thinking relative to both episodic past and future simulation regardless of the valence of the 
simulated event. 
The foregoing results suggest that episodic counterfactual thinking and episodic future 
thinking share at least some phenomenological features. Another similarity concerns the 
consequences of imagining future events or constructing counterfactual simulations of past 
events for subsequent memory. It has been demonstrated that repeatedly imagining that one is 
going to perform an action can lead to false memories of actually having performed the action 
(e.g., Goff & Roediger, 1998).  A recent study by Gerlach et al. (2013) indicates that 
constructing counterfactual simulations can also lead to subsequent memory distortion. For 
example, in one experiment younger and older adults selected and performed different actions. 
They then recalled performing some of those actions, counterfactually imagined that they had 
performed alternative actions to some of the selected/performed actions, and did not recall or 
imagine others. On a later memory test, participants were more likely to falsely remember 
counterfactual actions as previously performed relative to actions they had not previously 
considered performing, and the effect was especially pronounced in older adults.  
In contrast to the foregoing similarities between episodic future thinking and 
counterfactual thinking, recent evidence also highlights sharp differences between the two. For 
instance, Ferrante, Girotto, Stragga, and Walsh (2013) had participants randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: counterfactual and future. In both conditions, participants had to solve 
scramble-word puzzles. However, no participant was able to solve all the puzzles successfully 
and they were asked to think about their failures as they prepared to receive another set of Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  15 
puzzles. Participants in the counterfactual condition were asked to reflect on their failures by 
thinking counterfactually about how things would have been better for them. Conversely, 
participants in the future condition were asked to reflect on their failures by thinking about how 
things will be better for them in the next trial. Ferrante et al. (2013) found that when participants 
thought counterfactually, their thoughts focused on uncontrollable features of the puzzle (e.g., 
“Things would have been better for me if the allocated time were longer”), whereas participants 
in the future condition thought about controllable features of the puzzle (e.g., “Things will be 
better for me if I concentrate more”). The authors interpret this asymmetry in temporal 
simulations as reflecting different constraints in the way each kind is deployed for strategizing 
about future actions. By their account,  “the possibility to still realize a future outcome may 
constrain mental simulation of the future more than mental simulation of the past (Ferrante et al., 
2013, p. 24). While this observation is broadly consistent with the idea we suggested earlier that 
episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking involve similar constructive 
processes that are differently constrained by reality, we noted that counterfactual thinking tends 
to be more constrained by reality than future thinking because it operates on representations of 
what actually happened rather than representations of what might happen. By contrast, Ferrante 
et al. (2013) focused on the idea that the controllability of hypothetical events may be more 
constrained in the future because the imagined hypothetical event might actually happen, 
whereas past hypothetical events cannot actually happen. 
Intriguingly, future versus counterfactual simulations show opposite effects of repetition 
on the perceived plausibility or likelihood of the imagined episodes. A number of studies have 
shown that when people repeatedly imagine a future event, they come to believe that the event is 
more likely to occur. For example, Carroll (1978) showed that participants who imagined that Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  16 
Jimmy Carter would win the 1976 presidential election were more likely to predict that Carter 
would win the election over Gerald Ford, whereas participants who imagined that Ford would 
win the election were more likely to predict a Ford victory. Subsequent studies extended this 
finding to other kinds of events, such as imagining winning a contest, contracting a disease, or 
performing an action such as donating blood: repeatedly imagining the target event was 
associated with an increase in the subjective likelihood that event would actually occur (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & 
Reynolds, 1985; for review, see Koehler, 1991).  
More recently, Szpunar and Schacter (2013) examined the effects of repeated simulation 
on specific, everyday future experiences – interpersonal interactions comprised of people, 
locations, and objects. Participants generated a series of familiar people, locations, and objects in 
an initial experimental session, and in a subsequent session simulated imaginary future 
experiences for each person-location-object combination and generated a brief title for each 
event. One-third of the imagined future experiences were emotionally positive, one-third were 
emotionally negative, and one-third were neutral. In a final, third experimental session, 
participants imagined half of these events three times prior to a final trial in which they imagined 
these target events once more, and along with events that had not been simulated during that 
session. On the final trial, participants provided ratings concerning the subjective plausibility of 
the simulated events, as well as valence, ease, detail, and arousal. Szpunar and Schacter (2013) 
found that repeated simulation was associated with a significant increase in the subjective 
plausibility that the simulated experiences would actually occur. However, this increased 
plausibility was observed only for positive or negative emotional events and not for neutral 
events. Further, increases in plausibility for positive events were associated with increases in Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  17 
arousal, and increases in plausibility for negative events were associated with increases in 
valence and ease of simulation (see Szpunar and Schacter, 2013, for discussion of possible 
cognitive mechanisms involved). 
De Brigard, Szpunar, et al. (2013) adapted the experimental paradigm used by Szpunar 
and Schacter (2013) to investigate the effects of repetition on the plausibility of counterfactual 
simulations. In an initial session, participants generated a series of negative, positive, and neutral 
autobiographical memories, each consisting of a critical person, location, and object. In a second 
session, participants engaged in upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual simulations about 
individual memories. For upward counterfactuals, participants imagined an alternative better way 
in which a negative episode could have occurred; for downward counterfactuals, participants 
imagined an alternative worse way in which a positive episode could have occurred; and for 
neutral counterfactuals, participants imagined an alternative way in which a neutral episode 
could have occurred without altering the emotional value of the actual event.  
In a third experimental session, participants re-simulated half of the upward, downward, 
and neutral counterfactuals three times each. Finally, they re-simulated all counterfactuals, and 
for each one, completed phenomenological ratings like those in the study by Szpunar and 
Schacter (2013) that assessed such features as detail, ease, and valence of the simulations and, 
most critically, their perceived plausibility. The key result from this experiment is that episodic 
counterfactual thoughts that were simulated repeatedly were rated as significantly less plausible 
than those that were simulated only once. The decrease in plausibility as a consequence of 
repetition occurred similarly for upward, downward, and neutral counterfactuals, thus indicating 
that the effect of repetition was independent of the direction in which simulated events were 
altered.  Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  18 
These results thus contrast sharply with those obtained for episodic future thinking, both 
in the study by Szpunar and Schacter (2013) and in earlier studies. Importantly, De Brigard, 
Szpunar, et al. (2013) also found that even though the perceived plausibility of episodic 
counterfactual thoughts decreased as a function of repeated simulation, both ratings of detail and 
ease increased with repetition, as observed in previous studies of future thinking (see Koehler, 
1991, for review). Thus in addition to highlighting a potentially important difference between 
episodic future and counterfactual thinking, these results also indicate that an increase in the 
perceived plausibility of imagined events is not a direct or inevitable consequence of an increase 
in detail and ease of simulation.  
De Brigard, Szpunar, et al. (2013) suggested a possible reason for the contrasting effects 
of repetition on episodic future and counterfactual thinking based on theories of counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., Byrne, 1997; Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Such theories hold that 
when people generate counterfactual thoughts they contrast mental representations of what is 
“true” (in the case of episodic counterfactual thoughts, an autobiographical episodic recollection) 
with a distinct mental representation that minimally deviates from the “true” one.  
Thus, when people first generate a counterfactual simulation the divergence from an actual 
autobiographical memory is minimal, so the perceived plausibility of the altered event is 
relatively high. With repetition, however, more attention can be given to details of the altered 
event. Consequently, the divergence from the actual memory would increase as a result, thereby 
rendering the simulated event less plausible to the individual. The critical difference from 
episodic future thinking is that in the latter kind of simulation, there is no actual or “true” 
representation against which to contrast an imagined event. Thus there is no divergence between Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  19 
a real and an imagined event that could influence the perceived plausibility of the imagined 
event.  
Implications for memory and decision making 
  The evidence we have considered so far reveals both neural and cognitive similarities 
between episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking, along with some 
differences. We conclude by considering some implications for thinking about the relation 
between memory and decisions. 
  The process of decision making is usually surrounded by uncertainty. To hedge this 
uncertainty, we tend to strategize either by envisioning possible scenarios that might occur as a 
result of a future choice, or by simulating alternative scenarios that might have occurred as a 
result of having chosen differently in the past (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  Both strategies are 
highly dependent on episodic memory, and as such are also prone to memory-related biases 
(Morewedge, Gilbert and Wilson, 2005). 
However, given the results reviewed earlier, indicating that in addition to commonalities 
there are a number of important differences between episodic future and episodic counterfactual 
simulation, it is an open question how these related simulation processes influence actions and 
behaviors. For instance, although the research considered earlier indicates that much has recently 
been learned about how repeated simulations of future and alternative past events influence the 
perceived plausibility of specific events, next to nothing is known about how repeated 
simulations influence subsequent behavior. If repeatedly simulated future events are perceived as 
more plausible than events that are not repeatedly simulated, then it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that people might be more likely to act on the contents of repeated as compared to non-repeated 
simulations of the future. Conversely, if repeated simulations of alternative past experiences are Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  20 
subjectively experienced as less plausible, then it is reasonable to predict that people might be 
less likely to rely on the contents of repeated counterfactuals when making decisions. Instead, 
repeated counterfactuals may lead people to accept that the future will turn out like the past, and 
use that information to guide their behavior accordingly (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield, Galinksky, 
Kray, & King, 2010; Kray, George, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Tetlock, & Roese, 2010; for related 
discussion, see Hershfield, 2013). Alternatively, repeated counterfactuals may lead people to 
identify new and better courses of future action. Identifying direct links between simulation, 
perceived likelihood, and behavior represents an exciting avenue for future research. 
Episodic simulations may have a particular impact on decisions that have long-term 
consequences, because they allow us to “prefeel” what it may be like to be in a specific future 
situation (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007), i.e., they can convey the emotional state of the anticipated 
episode. To the degree that this state is positive, it may motivate farsighted choices that would 
make it more likely to actually experience the simulated future event. This hypothesis was tested 
by Benoit, Gilbert, and Burgess (2011), who used the phenomenon of temporal discounting as a 
measure of shortsighted decision making. Temporal discounting refers to our tendency to 
devalue a reward with the delay until its delivery (e.g., Green and Myerson, 2004). For example, 
$10 has a greater subjective value when it could be received immediately than when it would 
only be delivered after a week. This psychological property becomes important when people 
have to choose between options that would pay off after different delays: people tend to prefer 
smaller rewards that they can receive immediately (e.g., $10 today) over larger rewards that they 
would only get later (e.g., $13 in a week). A possible reason for our tendency to devalue delayed 
rewards is that, at the moment of the choice, we do not experience the emotional impact 
associated with the future reward option (e.g., Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  21 
Simulating the future episode enables us to bridge that gap between the moment of chosing 
and the moment of reward delivery, and thus allows for an immediate experience of the anticipated 
event’s affective impact. The experienced emotional state may then increase the valuation of the 
imagined reward, and thus effectively attenuate its discounting (Boyer, 2008; see also Berns, 
Laibson, & Lowenstein, 2007). To test this hypothesis, Benoit et al. (2011) instructed participants to 
imagine specific episodes of spending money (e.g., £35 in 180 days at a pub), or to merely estimate 
what the money could purchase in the scenario. Thus, both conditions shared similar semantic 
retrieval demands, but only the imagine task required participants to simulate what it would be like 
to be in the respective episodes. Following each trial, participants indicated their preference for 
either the delayed reward option that they had just considered (e.g., £35 in 90 days), or for a smaller 
reward that they would receive immediately (i.e., £25 now). Consistent with the hypothesized 
mechanism, participants were more likely to choose the delayed reward option following episodic 
simulations (see also Peters and Büchel, 2010). Moreover, episodic simulations were particularly 
effective in biasing subsequent decisions in cases where they induced a strong emotional experience, 
suggesting that the phenomenological qualities of the simulation were instrumental in mediating this 
effect. 
Intriguingly, those individuals who benefited the most from imagining future scenarios 
typically care relatively little about the future consequences of their actions. This latter trait has 
been shown to predict, among other things, the relationship between planning and actually 
quitting smoking (Kovač and Rise, 2007), and between beliefs regarding environmental 
consequences of commuting by car and preferences to take public transport (Joireman, Van 
Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004). A better understanding of the motivational consequences of episodic 
future simulations might thus help to optimize everyday decisions that have economic, Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  22 
environmental, and public health-related consequences (e.g., Oluyomi Daniel, Stanton, & 
Epstein, in press). 
Using fMRI, Benoit et al. (2011) implicated components of the core network in 
mediating this effect. Activation in rostromedial prefrontal cortex reflected the undiscounted 
reward magnitude of the imagined episode, and those individuals who exhibited greater reward 
sensitivity in this region also showed a stronger attenuating effect on discounting. The reduction 
in discounting was also associated with increased coupling between the rostromedial prefrontal 
cortex and hippocampus (see also Peters & Büchel, 2010). Therefore, the effect of episodic 
simulations on farsighted decisions appears to be mediated by interactions between the 
hippocampus, a region involved in mentally constructing future scenarios, and the rostromedial 
prefrontal cortex, a region involved in the representation of the imagined rewards.  
Taken together, these data indicate that processes mediated by the core network can be 
utilized to imagine the future consequences of one’s actions (e.g., having $35 at one’s next visit 
to the pub). The immediate experience of the anticipated future emotional state associated with 
that episode, in turn, can influence one’s decisions. Given that similar constructive processes are 
likely employed in counterfactual thinking, the question arises whether considering alternative 
outcomes of past events could also influence one’s future-oriented decisions.  
A typical consequence of upward counterfactuals is the feeling of regret (Roese et al.,  
2009), and there is some intriguing evidence for the impact of regret on monetary decisions. 
Camille, Coricelli, Sallet, Pradat-Diehl, Duhamel, and Sirgiu (2004) asked participants to make 
repeated choices between two risky gambles, and assessed the emotional reactions to the 
outcome. Unsurprisingly, volunteers were happier when their choice resulted in a gain rather 
than a loss. However, their emotional experience was not only determined by the outcome of Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  23 
their actual choice but also by a comparison with the outcome of the alternative, foregone option. 
That is, the same nominal win induced happiness when the rejected gamble would have led to a 
loss, but it actually could induce unhappiness when the alternative gamble would have led to a 
greater win. Thus, the comparison between what had been and what could have been triggered 
the emotion of regret. Camille et al. (2004) further modeled participants’ choices and 
demonstrated that their decisions were not only influenced by the expected values of the two 
gambles but also by the avoidance of anticipated regret. Critically, this was not the case for a 
group of patients with lesions including the orbitofrontal cortex. They neither reported regret nor 
did their choices reveal the disposition to avoid regret. In the long-term, the healthy volunteers 
accumulated greater wins, indicating that –in the context of this task- the experience of regret 
and its subsequent avoidance biased decisions towards more farsighted choices. In a follow-up 
fMRI study, Coricelli, Critchley, Joffily, O’Doherty, Sirgiu, & Dolan (2005) associated greater 
regret with enhanced activation in regions including medial prefrontal cortex and the 
hippocampus, i.e., in core network structures similar to those reported by Benoit et al. (2011). 
Though participants in the studies on regret may not have simulated elaborate 
counterfactual episodes, these data are consistent with the possibility that a mechanism may have 
supported the effect of regret on decisions that is akin to the one shown to effectively attenuate 
discounting via future simulations (Benoit et al., 2011). Both “prefeeling” a possible future 
scenario and reminiscing about foregone past choices could thus provide motivational incentives 
that foster more farsighted decisions.  
 However, this mechanism need not always enhance the probability of making choices 
that are beneficial in the long run. For example, often our simulations of the future are erroneous, 
because they do not take into account that the context of the actual event may be different from Episodic future and counterfactual thinking  24 
the current context (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Moreover, simple fantasizing about a possible 
future episode by itself may not be sufficient to attain a strong goal commitment (Oettingen and 
Stephens, 2009). These and related pitfalls of episodic simulations of future events remind us 
that their impact on decision making may not always be beneficial (for review and discussion, 
see Schacter, 2012). Nonetheless, a growing body of research has revealed that episodic 
simulations can usefully support a variety of adaptive functions, including the aforementioned 
effects on farsighted decision making (Schacter, 2012). Thus, a critical task for future research 
will be to identify the efficacy and boundary conditions of episodic simulations in improving 
decisions. Given the critical role that memory plays in generating episodic simulations, such 
research should enhance our broader understanding of the relation between memory and 
decisions. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of Key Concepts 
Concept        Definition               
Episodic future thinking    Imagining or simulating a specific episode that might occur 
          in one’s personal future 
 
Episodic counterfactual thinking  Imagining or simulating alternative versions or outcomes of 
past personal episodes that could have happened but did not 
occur 
 
Counterfactual thinking  Imagining alternatives to reality that need not involve 
future or past personal episodes 
 
Downward counterfactual  Imagining that an event had a more negative outcome than 
it actually did  
 
Upward counterfactual  Imagining that an event had a more positive outcome than 
it actually did 
 
Episodic memory  Memory for specific past personal experiences 
 
Semantic memory  Memory for facts and general knowledge 
 
Autobiographical memory  Memory for past personal experiences that can include both 
episodic and semantic knowledge 
 
 